THIRD DIVISION
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ANTONIO P. TAN, Petitioner, - versus - |
G.R. No.
157194 Present: QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
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HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former
Fourth Division), THE HONORABLE WILFREDO
D. REYES, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31,
Manila, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA and DPG DEVELOPMENT
& MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Respondents. |
Promulgated: June 20, 2006 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision[1] dated September 10, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56873,
and its Resolution[2] dated February 17, 2003. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[3] dated
The
facts are as follows:
Petitioner
Antonio P. Tan is the lessee of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 165501 located at
On
For
failing to file a responsive pleading, the trial court declared the private
respondent in default. The petitioner was
allowed to present evidence ex parte.
On
Elevated to the Court of Appeals, the
trial court’s decision was reversed and it was directed to conduct a new trial
and to admit the answer of the private respondent. Likewise, the appellate court ordered the use
of the evidence recorded during the first trial insofar as they were material in
the resolution of the issues in the case.
The Supreme Court affirmed the
appellate court’s decision.
During
the trial in the lower court, the private respondent filed on
Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied in the Order dated
On
The Court of Appeals
ruled that for a petition for annulment of judgment to prosper, it is required
that: (1) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due
process of law; or (2) the judgment has been obtained by fraud. It explained that the fraud referred to must either
be extrinsic or collateral fraud to set aside a judgment. Such fraud should have been neither revealed nor deliberately suppressed
from the opposing party and the court.
Absent these requisites, relief could be available only subject to
certain conditions.
According to the appellate court, the
petitioner failed to meet these requisites.
It also added that the petitioner’s innuendos that the legal infirmity
emanated from his former counsel’s negligence cannot be given weight since it
is a well-settled rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client just as
the latter is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The appellate court also said that the petitioner
failed to avail of the remedies provided for in Rule 47,[10]
Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court without any justification. Hence, he must suffer the consequences of his
own inaction or negligence. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DISMISSED, hereby AFFIRMING the assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 31) in
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
In the instant petition for review, the
petitioner now submits the following issues for our consideration:
1.
whether OR NOT petitioner IS ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS FOR THE SINGLE
NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY HIS PREVIOUS COUNSEL FOR FAILURE TO APPEAL ON TIME.
2.
whether or not petitioner can avail [of] the preferential RIGHT TO FIRST
REFUSAL UNDER [ARTICLES] 1279, 1380, 1381, 1403, SUB-PARAGRAPH 2, 1479,
and 1544 of the [new] civil code of the
While the
petitioner admits that he failed to file the notice of appeal seasonably, he
contends that it was due to the patent negligence of his previous counsel who failed
to inform him of the denial of the notice of appeal and the motion for
reconsideration filed thereafter.
According to the petitioner, his counsel’s negligence amounted to betrayal
of confidence and a serious violation of a lawyer’s oath, which should have
prompted the appellate court to take cognizance of the notice of appeal and the
petition for annulment of judgment.
The private respondent, on the other
hand, maintains that no extrinsic fraud existed in the case to warrant the
relief under Rule 47. The petitioner had
the chance to ventilate his case before the lower court but the case was
dismissed with finality due to his failure to perfect his appeal to the Court
of Appeals.
After considering the circumstances
in this case, and the submission of the parties, we agree that the petition
should be denied for lack of merit.
Jurisprudence teems with
pronouncements that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period permitted by law is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to perfect the appeal renders the
judgment of the court final and executory.[13] Just as a losing party has the privilege to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.[14] Furthermore, a denial of a petition for being
time-barred is a decision on the merits.[15]
Although the Court may extend the
time or allow the perfection of the appeal beyond the prescribed period if it is
satisfactorily shown that there is justifiable reason, such as fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, or similar supervening cause, without fault of
the appellant, and the appeal is deemed taken and perfected on time, and the
appellate court acquires appellate jurisdiction,[16]
the circumstances here do not convince us to take exception. While the petitioner made a painstaking
effort to attribute the loss of the remedy of appeal to the fault entirely of
his former counsel, this Court cannot turn a blind eye to his own negligence
and apathy.
The findings
of the appellate court, as fully substantiated by the records, showed that the petitioner
was equally guilty of negligence, thus,[17]
In the first place, the remedy of appeal was lost
through the fault of petitioner, particularly of his counsel. Thus, the first requisite [abovecited] is
clearly not satisfied here. Besides,
it is incredible that petitioner did not bother to check the status of his case
with his lawyer in spite that he stood to lose his alleged property on which he
was operating his business. He therefore could not complain of the
negligence of his counsel in not informing him of the outcome of the case when
he himself did not bother to check with his counsel or to find out the status
of his case. It is the duty of a
party-litigant to be in contact with this counsel from time to time in order to
be informed of the progress of his case. (Underscoring ours.)
Both the petitioner and his former counsel offered no justification why the
notice of appeal was filed eleven days beyond the reglementary period. Likewise, the petitioner failed to explain
why he only learned of the dismissal of his case five months later. Involving as it did the loss of the property where
both his residence and business establishment are built, no less than staunch
vigilance in safeguarding his rights was expected from the petitioner.
The petitioner
manifestly failed to display in the proceedings below the expected degree of
concern or attention to his case. In Leonardo v. S.T. Best, Inc.,[18]
we reiterated that:
As clients, petitioners should have maintained contact
with their counsel from time to time, and informed themselves of the progress
of their case, thereby exercising that standard of care “which an ordinarily
prudent man bestows upon his business.”
Even in
the absence of the petitioner’s negligence, the rule in this jurisdiction is
that a party is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. In the earlier case of Tesoro v. Court of Appeals,[19]
we emphasized –
It has been repeatedly enunciated that “a client is
bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard
to complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded
differently. A client is bound by the
mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds
were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end
to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show
that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or
learned.”
Thus,
with the ordinary remedy of appeal lost through the petitioner’s own fault, we affirm
that no reversible error was committed in the dismissal of the petition by the appellate
court.
The remedy of annulment of judgment
can be resorted to only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.[20] In the case at bar, the loss of the remedy of
appeal is attributable to the petitioner’s and his former counsel’s fault.
Moreover, annulment of judgment may
either be based on the ground that the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.[21] By no stretch of the imagination can we equate
the negligence of the petitioner and his former counsel to extrinsic fraud as
contemplated in the cited rules. Extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation
which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent.[22] The fraud or deceit cannot be of the losing
party’s own doing, nor must it contribute to it. The extrinsic fraud must be employed against
it by the adverse party, who, because of some trick, artifice, or device,
naturally prevails in the suit.[23] This Court notes that no such fraud or deceit
was properly proved against the private respondent. Indeed, the petitioner has no reason to
protest his own negligence.
Anent the second issue, records show that
the same had been resolved with finality by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40 in
Civil Case No. 86-37402 in an Order[24] dated
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 14-24. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Mabutas, Jr., with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios, and Edgardo P. Cruz concurring.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 31-34.
[4]
[5]
[6] G.R. No. 86787,
“The
real purpose of the
[7] 31 Phil 590 (1915).
[8] CA rollo,
p. 33.
[9]
[10] SEC. 2. Grounds for annulment. – The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic
fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
[11] Rollo, p. 24.
[12]
[13] See
Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 142689, October 17, 2002, 391
SCRA 192, 202; Dayrit v. Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No.
140316, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA 117, 125; Videogram Regulatory Board v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106564, November 28, 1996, 265 SCRA 50, 56; Bank
of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., G.R. No. 73210, February 10, 1994,
230 SCRA 9, 15; Ceniza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95296, February 3,
1993, 218 SCRA 390, 397-398; Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 101527, January 19, 1993, 217 SCRA 237, 246.
[14] See
Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, supra; Dayrit v. Philippine
Bank of Communications, supra; Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, G.R.
No. 141986, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 466, 485; Videogram Regulatory Board v.
Court of Appeals, supra.
[15] See
Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[16] See
Trans International v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128421, January 26,
1998, 285 SCRA 49, 57-58 citing Santiago and Flores v. Valenzuela and Pardo,
78 Phil. 397 (1947).
[17] Rollo, pp. 14-24, citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (Special Sixth Division),
G.R. No. 106153,
[18] G.R. No. 142066,
[19] No. L-36666, December 19, 1973, 54 SCRA
296, 304; See Amil v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125272, October 7, 1999,
316 SCRA 317, 322-323; Velasquez v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 124049, June 30, 1999,
309 SCRA 539, 549; Pallada v. Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. 1,
G.R. No. 129442, March 10, 1999, 304 SCRA 440, 445.
[20] Rules
of Court, Rule 47, Sec. 1.
[21]
[22] See
Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140799, September 10, 2002, 388
SCRA 527, 535; Heirs of Antonio Pael v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
133547 & 133843, February 10, 2000, 325 SCRA 341, 359.
[23] See
People v. Verra, G.R. No. 134732,
[24] CA
rollo, pp. 78-80.
[25] See
Pallada v. Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. 1, supra
note 19, at 447; Garbo v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 100474, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 250, 255-256; Enriquez v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83720, October 4, 1991, 202 SCRA 487, 491-492; Zansibarian Residents Asso. v.